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BLD-035        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-2172 
 ___________ 
 
LESLIE CHARLES COHEN, 
also known as L.C. Cohen, 




HARLEY G. LAPPIN, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP); 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES; JOHN MORTON; 
DEBORAH H. HICKORY; MICHAEL JOSEPH GROWSE; 
MARIA FRANCISCA MARRERO; MARVIN S. PITT 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 10-cv-00035) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to 
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
November 12, 2010 
 Before:  SLOVITER, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 







 Appellant Leslie Cohen appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing his 
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petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and from the court’s subsequent orders denying his 
motions for reconsideration and relief from judgment.  We will affirm. 
 Cohen is a federal prisoner currently housed in the Moshannon Valley 
Correctional Center in Philipsburg, Pennsylvania.  Cohen filed a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in November 2009, which was eventually 
transferred to the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  
The details of Cohen’s claims are set forth in the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 
Recommendation and the District Court’s Memorandum Orders, and need not be 
discussed at length here.  Briefly, Cohen alleged in his § 2241 petition that a detainer 
lodged by the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement and a “false 
INTERPOL” detainer were adversely impacting his custody level and security 
designation.  Cohen set forth additional claims in his petition and addendum challenging 
certain conditions of his confinement.  Cohen requested various forms of injunctive relief 
as well as monetary damages. 
 Having concluded that Cohen could not proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the 
District Court summarily dismissed the petition.  The District Court determined that 
Cohen was not “in custody” pursuant to the challenged detainers as required for relief 
pursuant to § 2241, and that the remainder of his claims must be brought in an action 
filed pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).  
The District Court thereafter denied Cohen’s reconsideration motion filed under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 59(e).  The District Court rejected Cohen’s contention that his petition should 
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have been converted into a civil rights complaint.  The District Court reasoned that the 
substantial differences between a habeas petition and a civil rights complaint -- including 
the applicability of the fee provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) and 
the procedural requirements peculiar to each type of action -- counseled against such a 
conversion.  Cohen was advised that the dismissal of his § 2241 petition was without 
prejudice to his right to pursue his claims in a civil action if he so desired. 
 Undeterred, Cohen sought further recourse in the District Court by filing a motion 
for relief pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).  Cohen primarily complained that the District 
Court’s dismissal would have a res judicata effect on any civil rights action he pursued, 
thus rendering the dismissal without prejudice meaningless.  Cohen requested, once 
again, that the District Court construe his petition as a Bivens complaint or transfer it 
back to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky.  Cohen’s 
motion for relief fared no better than did his request for reconsideration.  The District 
Court reiterated that Cohen’s civil rights claims were dismissed without prejudice to his 
right to raise them in a civil rights complaint, and noted that his other arguments had been 
adequately addressed in its prior order.  Accordingly, the District Court denied Cohen’s 
Rule 60(b) motion, as well as his subsequent motion seeking reconsideration of that 
decision.  This timely appeal followed. 
 We have jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our 
review of the District Court’s decision to dismiss Cohen’s § 2241 petition is plenary, see 
Cradle v. U.S. ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002), and we review the District 
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Court’s orders denying his motions filed under Rules 59(e) and 60(b) for an abuse of 
discretion.  See Max’s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999); 
Brown v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 350 F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 2003). 
  To the extent that Cohen seeks to challenge the detainers he claims have been 
lodged against him, we agree with the District Court that Cohen is not “in custody” 
pursuant to those detainers so as to seek relief pursuant to § 2241.  See, e.g., Zolicoffer v. 
United States Dep’t of Justice, 315 F.3d 538, 540-41 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing cases).  We 
likewise agree that the remainder of the claims presented in Cohen’s petition do not 
challenge the basic fact or duration of his imprisonment, which is the “essence of 
habeas.”  See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973).  This includes Cohen’s 
challenge to his security designation and custody classification.  In the absence of the 
type of change in custody level at issue in Woodall v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 432 
F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2005), such an objection is simply not a proper challenge to the 
“execution” of a sentence cognizable in a § 2241 proceeding.  Thus, the District Court 
correctly determined that Cohen’s remaining claims should be brought in a Bivens action.  
See Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen the challenge is to a 
condition of confinement such that a finding in plaintiff's favor would not alter his 
sentence or undo his conviction, [a civil rights action] is appropriate.”).   
 Finally, given the significant differences between the rules applicable to a 
prisoner’s general civil litigation case and a request for habeas relief, we cannot conclude 
that the District Court abused its discretion in denying Cohen’s post-judgment requests 
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under Rules 59(e) and 60(b) to have his § 2241 petition re-characterized as a Bivens 
complaint and transferred back to the District Court in Kentucky.  As noted previously, 
the District Court provided that its dismissal was without prejudice to Cohen’s ability to 
pursue his claims in a Bivens action. 
 For the foregoing reasons and because the appeal presents no substantial question, 
we will summarily affirm the order of dismissal and the District Court’s subsequent 
orders denying post-judgment relief.  See Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
